Civil Conflict and Secessions

Enrico Spolaore

No 705, Discussion Papers Series, Department of Economics, Tufts University from Department of Economics, Tufts University

Abstract: This paper studies secessions as the outcome of conflict between regions. We study under what conditions regions will divert costly resources to fight each other over political borders. We derive the probability of secession and the amount of resources diverted to separatist conflict, and show how those variables depend on factors such as heterogeneity costs, economies of scale, relative size, and external threats. We also model civil conflict over types of government, after borders have been determined, and study how this political conflict affects the incentives to secede.

Keywords: Secessions; Conflict Technology; Heterogeneity Costs; Economies of Scale; External Threats. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H10 H56 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Journal Article: Civil conflict and secessions (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:tuf:tuftec:0705

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