Adverse selection in the U.S. health insurance markets: Evidence from the MEPS

P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers from Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: We use the 2003/2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey in conjunctions with the 2002 National Health Interview Survey to test for adverse selection in the U.S. private health insurance market. The key idea is to test whether the individuals who are more exposed to health risks also buy insurance contracts with more coverage or higher expected payments. The critical statistical problem is that the extension of insurance is only measured for those who are insured and face positive health care expenditure. So there is a possible sample selection bias effect. The procedure used is based on a method suggested by Wooldridge (1995). The method also accounts for heterogeneity across individuals. The simultaneous account taken of both possible sources of bias is new for this kind of application.

Keywords: adverse selection; health insurance; risk profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I11 I18 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hea and nep-ias
Date: 2008-04
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