Free-riding on altruistic punishment? An experimental comparison of third-party-punishment in a stand-alone and in an in-group environment

Lewisch Peter, Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: This paper deals with the subject of third-party punishment. The paper compares, by means of an economic experiment, punishment by a third party (Stand-Alone case) with punishment by third parties (In-Group environment). This deliberate introduction of a second potential punisher is neither subtle nor marginal. Shifting punishment choices into this "enlarged environment" allows us to study, in a systematic way, the complex relationship between the punisher's expectations about her/his peer's punishment decisions and her/his own punishment choices. In particular, we aim to examine whether, on average, individual punishment is systematically lower in an In-Group environment compared with the Stand-Alone case.

Keywords: Third-Party Punishment; Collective Punishment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 C92 K42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2010-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Free-Riding on Altruistic Punishment? An Experimental Comparison of Third-Party Punishment in a Stand-Alone and in an In-Group Environment (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:139

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