Gender at work: Productivity and incentives

Matteo Migheli ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: This paper analyses the relationship between workers' gender and monetary incentives in an experimental setting based on a double-tournament scheme. The participants must choose between a piece-rate payment or a performance prize. The results show that women tend to shy away from competition, and are less sensitive than men to the monetary incentives of the tournament. In addition the tournament scheme induces males, but not women, to signal their ability and to select the contract which is more profitable for them.

Keywords: gender; incentives; work; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 J16 J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2010-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1zg1SGjqjylsTdloVd ... OcP/view?usp=sharing (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Gender at Work: Productivity and Incentives (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:142

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Lucia Padovani ().