Competition among parties and power: An empirical analysis

Matteo Migheli (), Guido Ortona () and Ferruccio Ponzano ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: According to commonsense wisdom, under proportionality a small centrist party enjoys an excess of power with reference to its share of seats (or votes) due to the possibility of blackmailing the larger ones. This hypothesis has been challenged on a theoretical ground, with some empirical support. In this paper we use simulation to test its validity. Our results strongly provide evidence that the hypothesis is actually wrong. What occurs is a transfer of power from the peryphery of the political spectrum towards the center, buth the major gainers are the large centrist parties and not the small ones.

Pages: 18 pages
Date: 2012-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-cmp and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Competition among parties and power: an empirical analysis (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:167

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