Efficiency wages and endogenous supervision technology

Ferruccio Ponzano ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: Analyses about supervision technology are not frequent in economic literature. This paper analyses an efficiency wage model with an endogenous choice of supervision technology. Starting from Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) and Bowles (1985) models’ I show a model with an endogenous and costly supervision technology to better explain the behaviour of firms and workers under asymmetric information in the labour market. In particular, I show how firms allocate costs between wages and supervision under these hypotheses and how unemployment affects this distribution.

JEL-codes: D21 J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 12 pages
Date: 2001-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lab and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:23

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