A simulative frame to study the integration of defectors in a cooperative setting

Marie-Edith Bissey () and Guido Ortona ()

P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers from Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The paper presents the results of some simulations of the effect of the invasion of non-cooperating subjects into a community adopting a cooperative convention. The convention is described by an indefinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma game. We check the effects on the robustness of the cooperating convention of two characteristics of the game, namely the number of cooperators and the "intelligence" of the players. The relevance for real-world problems is discussed. The simulation program, written in SWARM, is highly flexible, and allows for the consideration of quite a lot of features.

Keywords: cooperation; conventions; prisoner's dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C63 C7 C88 D74 J7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cmp, nep-gth and nep-pke
Date: Written 2002-01
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