Optimal provision of public goods under imperfect intergovernmental competition

Ferruccio Ponzano ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to develop a model that includes two tiers of government providing public goods with the same tax base to finance them. Their rent is related to the level of competition. Citizens maximize their own utility starting from these different levels of competition. Therefore, they can decide to turn down the governments to induce them to behave efficiently. Moreover, governments can choose whether to accept the behaviour urged by citizens or to maximize their rent for a single period of office and consequently lose the next elections.

JEL-codes: H11 H21 H71 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22 pages
Date: 2005-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:44

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