Mean voting rule and strategical behavior: an experiment

Carla Marchese () and Marcello Montefiori

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: This paper considers the problem of voting about the quantity of a public good. An experiment has been run in order to test the extent of the strategic bias that arises in the individual vote when the social choice rule is to select the mean of the quantities voted for; conflicting theoretical predictions are available in the literature on this purpose. The political implications of the mean rule and its e.ects upon e.ciency are also discussed. The role of voters' information is considered. A comparison is made with the working of the median rule.

JEL-codes: C91 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:49

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