L'influenza dei sistemi elettorali nella stabilita' dei governi

Davide Biassoni

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The aim of this paper is to study the consequences of different electoral systems in terms of stability of the executive branch, through their influence on the structure of the party system. The main purpose is to examine whether plurality systems cause stability while proportional ones give rise to instability. I carried out some simulations by using the program Alex4.1. I processed the data concerning the results of the 2006 Italian general election and I defined the Italian political space on the grounds of Benoit and Laver's expert survey. Stability was then evaluated by using Schofield's and Shepsle's theories. The use of the two theories led to different conclusions, which deserve further investigation.

Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2007-08
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