Explaining differences in environmental governance patterns between Canada, Italy and the United States

Albert Breton, Anthony Scott and Angela Fraschini ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The objective of the paper is to formulate a hypothesis that can help explain the different patterns of environmental governance in three countries: Canada and the United States (both federal states) and Italy (a decentralized unitary state). To that effect, we will make use of what is a robust theory of the assignment of powers in federal and decentralized unitary states on the role of competition as a driving force in shaping these assignments. The differing patterns of environmental governance we wish to explain are that most environmental policies are enacted and implemented by the national government in the United States, by provincial governments in Canada, and by both national and regional governments in Italy.

JEL-codes: H O57 Q5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2007-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-pbe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:87

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