Non-self-centered inequity aversion matters. A model

Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano ()

POLIS Working Papers from Institute of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The model by Fehr and Schmidt introduces envy and altruism in the utility function of a representative agent. The aim of this paper is to provide two extensions - non linearity and non self-centredness - to this model. This extension turns out to be more consistent with experimental evidence than the original model.

Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2007-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:uca:ucapdv:91

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