Non-self-centered inequity aversion matters. A model

Stefania Ottone and Ferruccio Ponzano ()

P.O.L.I.S. department's Working Papers from Department of Public Policy and Public Choice - POLIS

Abstract: The model by Fehr and Schmidt introduces envy and altruism in the utility function of a representative agent. The aim of this paper is to provide two extensions – non linearity and non self-centredness – to this model. This extension turns out to be more consistent with experimental evidence than the original model.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp and nep-upt
Date: 2007-12
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