Cyberspace Auctions and Pricing Issues: A Review of Empirical Findings

Patrick Bajari and Ali Hortacsu

Working Papers from Stanford University, Department of Economics

Abstract: April 2002

This article surveys empirical findings from recent studies of Internet auctions and summarizes the economic insights gained from these findings. The main questions addressed in this article are: What are the rules of the game used in online auctions and how do these rules influence bidding behavior, such as sniping or bid shading? Is a good reputation, as measured by a seller’s feedback, valued by bidders and is feedback important in making online markets function well? Is the “winner’s curse” present in online auctions? How do minimum bids and secret reserve prices affect bidding and final sale prices?

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Date: 2002-04
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