Manipulation via Endowments in a Market with Profit Maximizing Agents

Somdeb Lahiri ()

Game Theory and Information from EconWPA

Abstract: In this paper we show that it is possible to manipulate market equilibria in an economy with profit maximizing agents (or agents with quasi-linear utility functions) by either destroying or withholding ones initial endowments.

Keywords: profit maximization; market equilibrium; manipulation via endowments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-11-25
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 14.
View list of references View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/game/papers/0511/0511008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0511008

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Game Theory and Information from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().