Tariff Liberalization and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

Robert M. Feinberg and Kara M. Olson
Additional contact information
Robert M. Feinberg: American University
Kara M. Olson: American University
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Kara Marie Reynolds ()

International Trade from EconWPA

Abstract: Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non- traditional protection against imports obtained through administrative procedures such as antidumping enforcement will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs and quotas are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalization in the spread of antidumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyze the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of antidumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of antidumping policies. We find that tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using antidumping protection but also the total number of antidumping petitions filed by countries.

Keywords: antidumping; tariffs; Uruguay Round (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-01-06
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 20
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://129.3.20.41/eps/it/papers/0501/0501001.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in International Trade from EconWPA
Series data maintained by EconWPA ().