Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High?

John Ramseyer and Eric Rasmusen ()

Law and Economics from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent -- why? On the one hand, because Japanese prosecutors are badly understaffed they may prosecute only their strongest cases and present judges only with the most obviously guilty defendants. On the other, because Japanese judges can be reassigned by the administrative office of the courts if they rule in ways the office does not like, judges may face biased career incentives to convict. Using data on the careers and opinions of 321 Japanese judges, we conclude that judges who acquit do indeed have worse careers following the acquittal. On closer examination, though, we find that the punished judges are not judges who acquitted on the ground that the prosecutors charged the wrong person. Rather, they are the judges who acquitted for reasons of statutory or constitutional interpretation, often in politically charged cases. Thus, the apparent punishment of acquitting judges seems unrelated to any pro-conviction bias at the judicial administrative offices, and the high conviction rates probably reflect low prosecutorial budgets instead.

Keywords: Japan; judges; political economy; prosecutors; convictions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D73 D78 H11 J44 K14 N45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-07-12
Note: Type of Document - PDF; prepared on Wintel 95; to print on ;
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Journal Article: Why Is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwple:9907001

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