Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation

Simone Valente ()

Public Economics from EconWPA

Abstract: This paper studies the welfare properties of distortionary transfers in a life-cycle growth model where natural capital is private property. The main result is that, under credible pre-commitment, each newborn generation prefers positive taxes-subsidies to laissez-faire conditions when the resource share in production is sufficiently high. By increasing the degree of natural preservation, resource-saving policies raise welfare of all generations except that of the first resource owner, who suffers a deadweight loss due to taxation of the initial stock. If the first owner renounces part of his claims over initial endowments, all successive generations support resource-saving policies for purely selfish reasons.

Keywords: Distortionary Taxation; Intergenerational Transfers; Overlapping Generations; Renewable Resources; Sustainability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H30 Q20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005-05-19
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 23
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http://129.3.20.41/eps/pe/papers/0505/0505008.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2005)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2006)
Working Paper: Intergenerational Transfers, Lifetime Welfare and Resource Preservation (2006)
Journal Article: Intergenerational transfers, lifetime welfare, and resource preservation (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wpa:wuwppe:0505008

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