Chance of revolts and ability of oppressions: a comment on the Acemoglu-Robinson model

Tetsuya Saito

No 2010-7, Economics Discussion Papers from Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel)

Abstract: In the original framework of Professors Acemoglu and Robinson, the government is unable to oppress the revolution once it is brought about. However, actual civil wars are unpredictable. With this notion, I introduce uncertainty depending on military expenditures of the government. Then an interesting argument follows: if the likelihood of successful oppression is sufficiently larger than a certain level of destruction rate and there are cheap-but-effective devices such as biochemicals, citizens in a dictatorial country may have a trade-off between economic prosperity and domestic military threats.

Keywords: Military expenditures; Acemoglu-Robinson model; war of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:ifwedp:20107

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