Brexit and Europe's future: A game theoretical approach
Henry Goecke and
No 18/2016, IW policy papers from Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln (IW) / Cologne Institute for Economic Research
Following the British decision to leave the European Union, the question arises as to how relations should be conducted going forward. The objective of the negotiations between Great Britain and the EU is to ensure which strategy is best - both for the British and the EU. Another important element is what long and short-term advantages can be obtained. Here, the authors will examine these questions from a game theoretical perspective. In any case, it is evident that the EU will benefit the most from an uncompromising approach to the negotiations in the long term, whatever the benefits in the short term.
JEL-codes: C72 E65 F13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:zbw:iwkpps:182016
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