Details about N. Emrah Aydinonat
Access statistics for papers by N. Emrah Aydinonat.
Last updated 2023-03-05. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
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Working Papers
2017
- Understanding with Theoretical Models
SocArXiv, Center for Open Science 
See also Journal Article Understanding with theoretical models, Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals (2014) View citations (6) (2014)
2006
- Game Theoretic Models as a Framework for Analysis: The Case of Coordination Conventions
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
- Institutions: Theory, History and Context-Specific Analysis
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany 
See also Journal Article Institutions: Theory, History and Context-Specific Analysis, History of Economic Ideas, Fabrizio Serra Editore, Pisa - Roma (2006) (2006)
2005
- An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model
Method and Hist of Econ Thought, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
See also Journal Article An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model, Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon (2005) View citations (5) (2005)
2000
- Invisible Hand Explanations: the Case of Menger's Explanation of the 'Origin of Money'
Method and Hist of Econ Thought, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
Journal Articles
2019
- Explanatory value in context: the curious case of Hotelling’s location model
The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, 2019, 26, (5), 879-910 View citations (2)
2018
- Philosophy of Economics Rules: introduction to the symposium
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2018, 25, (3), 211-217 View citations (1)
- The diversity of models as a means to better explanations in economics
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2018, 25, (3), 237-251 View citations (6)
2014
- Understanding with theoretical models
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2014, 21, (1), 19-36 View citations (6)
See also Working Paper Understanding with Theoretical Models, SocArXiv (2017) (2017)
2012
- The two images of economics: why the fun disappears when difficult questions are at stake?
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2012, 19, (3), 243-258 View citations (1)
- «People are not usually stupid», but is this enough for economics? A review essay on Maurice Lagueux, Rationality and Explanation in Economics, London and New York, Routledge, 2010, pp. xx+276
History of Economic Ideas, 2012, 20, (3), 153-166
2011
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics, Harold Kincaid and Don Ross (eds), Oxford University Press, 2009, xviii + 670 pages
Economics and Philosophy, 2011, 27, (3), 317-324
2010
- Is spontaneous order a value-free descriptive methodological tool?
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, 17, (4), 448-452
- Neuroeconomics: more than inspiration, less than revolution
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2010, 17, (2), 159-169 View citations (4)
2007
- Models, conjectures and exploration: an analysis of Schelling's checkerboard model of residential segregation
Journal of Economic Methodology, 2007, 14, (4), 429-454 View citations (10)
2006
- Institutions: Theory, History and Context-Specific Analysis
History of Economic Ideas, 2006, 14, (3), 145-158 
See also Working Paper Institutions: Theory, History and Context-Specific Analysis, MPRA Paper (2006) (2006)
- Is the Invisible Hand un− Smithian? A Comment on Rothschild
Economics Bulletin, 2006, 2, (2), 1-9 View citations (2)
2005
- An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model
Economics Bulletin, 2005, 2, (2), 1-7 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper An interview with Thomas C. Schelling: Interpretation of game theory and the checkerboard model, Method and Hist of Econ Thought (2005) View citations (4) (2005)
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