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Details about Richard Boylan

E-mail:rboylan@rice.edu
Homepage:http://www.cba.ua.edu/personnel/RichardBoylan.html
Workplace:Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies, Culverhouse College of Business, University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Richard Boylan.

Last updated 2008-09-27. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pbo7


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Working Papers

2009

  1. Intended and Unintended Consequences of Prison Reform
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc Downloads View citations (1)

2000

  1. Size, Monitoring and Plea Rate: An Examination of United States Attorneys
    Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers, Econometric Society Downloads

1998

  1. Corruption and staff expenditures in the U.S. Congress
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  2. Private bills: a theoretical and empirical study of lobbying
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (5)
    Also in Washington University, Business, Law and Economics Center, John M. Olin School of Business, Washington University (1997) View citations (1)

1996

  1. An optimal auction perspective on lobbying
    Public Economics, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article An optimal auction perspective on lobbying, Social Choice and Welfare, Springer (2000) Downloads View citations (3) (2000)

1990

  1. Equilibria Resistant to Mutation
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads
  2. Fictitious Play: A Statistical Study of Multiple Economic Experiments
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads View citations (2)
  3. Laws of Large Numbers for Dynamical Systems with Randomly Matched Individuals
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads View citations (3)

Undated

  1. A Bellman's Equation for the Study of Income Smoothing
    Computing in Economics and Finance 1996, Society for Computational Economics Downloads
  2. Contracting and Income Smoothing in an Infinite Agency Model
    Computing in Economics and Finance 1997, Society for Computational Economics Downloads
  3. Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results
    Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Downloads
    See also Journal Article Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*), Economic Theory, Springer (1996) View citations (11) (1996)

Journal Articles

1999

  1. An optimal auction perspective on lobbying
    Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, 17, (1), 55-68 Downloads View citations (3)
    See also Working Paper An optimal auction perspective on lobbying, Public Economics (1996) Downloads View citations (2) (1996)

1996

  1. Political competition in a model of economic growth: Some theoretical results (*)
    Economic Theory, 1996, 7, (2), 191-205 View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper Political Competition in a Model of Economic Growth; Some Theoretical Results, Working Papers Downloads

1995

  1. Voting over Economic Plans
    American Economic Review, 1995, 85, (4), 860-71 Downloads View citations (9)
 
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