Details about Pierre Chaigneau

Access statistics for papers by Pierre Chaigneau.

Last updated 2023-03-16. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pch1493

Working Papers

2021

1. How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   See also Journal Article in Review of Financial Studies (2022)
2. The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

2019

3. The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
   LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
   See also Journal Article in Games and Economic Behavior (2019)

2018

4. Does improved information improve incentives?
   LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (3)
   See also Journal Article in Journal of Financial Economics (2018)

2017

5. Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article in Economics Letters (2017)

2015

6. Downside Risk Neutral Probabilities
   Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article in Economic Theory Bulletin (2020)

2014

7. Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective
   Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE
8. The Generalized Informativeness Principle
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (1)
   Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2014) View citations (1)
9. The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (5)
   Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2014) View citations (10)
10. The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
    NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc
    Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2014) View citations (3)

2013

11. The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (3)

2012

12. Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (2)
    Also in FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group (2011)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Economics and Business (2013)
13. Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE
14. The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (7)
    See also Journal Article in Finance Research Letters (2018)
15. Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (19)
    Also in FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group (2012) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article in Journal of Finance (2015)

2010

16. Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts
    FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group
17. The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation
    FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group

Journal Articles

2022

1. How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
   (On the optimality of resetting executive stock options)
   Review of Financial Studies, 2022, 35, (1), 168-206
   See also Working Paper (2021)

2020

2. Downside risk-neutral probabilities
   Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, 8, (1), 65-77
   See also Working Paper (2015)

2019

3. The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 113, (C), 743-755
   See also Working Paper (2019)

2018

4. Does improved information improve incentives?
   Journal of Financial Economics, 2018, 130, (2), 291-307 View citations (4)
   See also Working Paper (2018)
5. Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors
   Journal of Business Ethics, 2018, 149, (3), 747-768
6. The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
   Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2018, 53, (3), 1297-1339 View citations (5)
7. The optimal timing of CEO compensation
   Finance Research Letters, 2018, 24, (C), 90-94 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper (2012)

2017

8. Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
   Economics Letters, 2017, 157, (C), 14-16 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper (2017)

2015

9. Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts
   Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, 3, (2), 223-232
10. Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
    The European Journal of Finance, 2015, 21, (15), 1357-1373 View citations (4)
11. Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
    Journal of Finance, 2015, 70, (4), 1805-1837 View citations (55)
    See also Working Paper (2012)

2013

12. Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion
    Journal of Economics and Business, 2013, 67, (C), 4-23 View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper (2012)
13. Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques
    L'Actualité Economique, 2013, 89, (2), 147-151
14. Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation
    Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9, (4), 778-789 View citations (18)