Details about Pierre Chaigneau

Access statistics for papers by Pierre Chaigneau.

Last updated 2024-11-06. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pch1493

Working Papers

2024

1. Executive Compensation with Social and Environmental Performance
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
2. Performance measure skewness and the structure of CEO compensation: Theory and evidence
   Post-Print, HAL

2023

3. A Theory of Fair CEO Pay
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
4. Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside
   MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
   See also Journal Article Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University Press (2024) (2024)

2022

5. How should performance signals affect contracts?
   LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (1)
   Also in CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers (2021)
   See also Journal Article How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?, The Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies (2022) View citations (1) (2022)

2021

6. The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring
   CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers
   See also Journal Article The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring, Journal of Accounting Research, Wiley Blackwell (2023) View citations (2) (2023)

2019

7. The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
   LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article The informativeness principle without the first-order approach, Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier (2019) View citations (1) (2019)

2018

8. Does improved information improve incentives?
   LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (5)
   See also Journal Article Does improved information improve incentives?, Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier (2018) View citations (6) (2018)

2017

9. Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
   Post-Print, HAL View citations (1)
   See also Journal Article Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2017) View citations (2) (2017)

2016

10. Downside risk neutral probabilities
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (1)
    Also in Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE (2015) View citations (1)
    See also Journal Article Downside risk-neutral probabilities, Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer (2020) (2020)

2014

11. Explaining the Association between Monitoring and Controversial CEO Pay Practices: an Optimal Contracting Perspective
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE
12. The Generalized Informativeness Principle
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (1)
    Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2014) View citations (1)
13. The Informativeness Principle Under Limited Liability
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (5)
    Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2014) View citations (10)
14. The Value of Informativeness for Contracting
    CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers View citations (3)
    Also in NBER Working Papers, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc (2014)
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2014)

2013

15. The effect of monitoring on CEO pay practices in a matching equilibrium
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library View citations (3)

2012

16. Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (1)
    Also in FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group (2011)
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2011)
    See also Journal Article Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion, Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier (2013) View citations (4) (2013)
17. Pay-for-Luck in CEO Compensation: Matching and Efficient Contracting
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE
18. The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (7)
    See also Journal Article The optimal timing of CEO compensation, Finance Research Letters, Elsevier (2018) View citations (3) (2018)
19. The effect of risk preferences on the valuation and incentives of compensation contracts
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
20. The structure of CEO pay: pay-for-luck and stock-options
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library
21. Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
    Cahiers de recherche, CIRPEE View citations (19)
    Also in FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group (2012) View citations (1)
    LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2012)
    See also Journal Article Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises, Journal of Finance, American Finance Association (2015) View citations (73) (2015)

2010

22. Aversion to the variability of pay and optimal incentive contracts
    FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group
    Also in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2010)
23. The Optimal Timing of Executive Compensation
    FMG Discussion Papers, Financial Markets Group
    Also in LSE Research Online Documents on Economics, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library (2010)

Journal Articles

2024

1. Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside
   Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2024, 59, (8), 3921-3958
   See also Working Paper Capital Structure with Information about the Upside and the Downside, MPRA Paper (2023) (2023)

2023

2. The Complementarity Between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring
   Journal of Accounting Research, 2023, 61, (1), 141-185 View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper The Complementarity between Signal Informativeness and Monitoring, CEPR Discussion Papers (2021) (2021)

2022

3. How Should Performance Signals Affect Contracts?
   The Review of Financial Studies, 2022, 35, (1), 168-206 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper How should performance signals affect contracts?, LSE Research Online Documents on Economics (2022) View citations (1) (2022)

2020

4. Downside risk-neutral probabilities
   Economic Theory Bulletin, 2020, 8, (1), 65-77
   See also Working Paper Downside risk neutral probabilities, LSE Research Online Documents on Economics (2016) View citations (1) (2016)

2019

5. The informativeness principle without the first-order approach
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2019, 113, (C), 743-755 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper The informativeness principle without the first-order approach, LSE Research Online Documents on Economics (2019) View citations (1) (2019)

2018

6. Does improved information improve incentives?
   Journal of Financial Economics, 2018, 130, (2), 291-307 View citations (6)
   See also Working Paper Does improved information improve incentives?, LSE Research Online Documents on Economics (2018) View citations (5) (2018)
7. Managerial Compensation and Firm Value in the Presence of Socially Responsible Investors
   Journal of Business Ethics, 2018, 149, (3), 747-768
8. The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium
   Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2018, 53, (3), 1297-1339 View citations (5)
9. The optimal timing of CEO compensation
   Finance Research Letters, 2018, 24, (C), 90-94 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper The Optimal Timing of CEO Compensation, Cahiers de recherche (2012) View citations (7) (2012)

2017

10. Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts
    Economics Letters, 2017, 157, (C), 14-16 View citations (2)
    See also Working Paper Prudence and the convexity of compensation contracts, Post-Print (2017) View citations (1) (2017)

2015

11. Changes in probability distributions and the form of compensation contracts
    Economic Theory Bulletin, 2015, 3, (2), 223-232
12. Risk aversion, prudence, and compensation
    The European Journal of Finance, 2015, 21, (15), 1357-1373 View citations (4)
13. Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises
    Journal of Finance, 2015, 70, (4), 1805-1837 View citations (73)
    See also Working Paper Transparency in the Financial System: Rollover Risk and Crises, Cahiers de recherche (2012) View citations (19) (2012)

2013

14. Explaining the structure of CEO incentive pay with decreasing relative risk aversion
    Journal of Economics and Business, 2013, 67, (C), 4-23 View citations (4)
    See also Working Paper Explaining the Structure of CEO Incentive Pay with Decreasing Relative Risk Aversion, Cahiers de recherche (2012) View citations (1) (2012)
15. Expliquer et contenir la prise de risque excessive des banques
    L'Actualité Economique, 2013, 89, (2), 147-151
16. Risk-shifting and the regulation of bank CEOs’ compensation
    Journal of Financial Stability, 2013, 9, (4), 778-789 View citations (18)