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Details about Emanuele Gerratana

E-mail:
Homepage:http://www.columbia.edu/~eg198/
Workplace:School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA), Columbia University, (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Emanuele Gerratana.

Last updated 2017-07-08. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pge97


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Working Papers

2013

  1. Commitment without Reputation: Renegotiation-Proof Contracts under Asymmetric Information
    Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Downloads
    See also Journal Article in Review of Economic Design (2015)

2012

  1. Renegotiation-Proof Third-Party Contracts under Asymmetric Information
    Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Downloads

2009

  1. Strategic Effects of Incomplete and Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
    Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Downloads
    See also Journal Article in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics (2012)

2008

  1. Delegation with Incomplete and Renegotiable Contracts
    Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Downloads

2007

  1. Games with Externalities and Delegation to a Common Agent
    Koç University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Working Papers, Koc University-TUSIAD Economic Research Forum Downloads

Journal Articles

2015

  1. Commitment without reputation: renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information
    Review of Economic Design, 2015, 19, (3), 173-209 Downloads View citations (1)
    See also Working Paper (2013)

2012

  1. Strategic Effects of Renegotiation-Proof Contracts
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012, 12, (1), 1-49 Downloads View citations (6)
    See also Working Paper (2009)
 
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