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Details about Aleksandra Masłowska-Jokinen

Workplace:Taloustieteen laitos (Department of Economics), Turun Kauppakorkeakoulu (Turku School of Economics), Turun Yliopisto (University of Turku), (more information at EDIRC)
Aboa Centre for Economics (ACE), (more information at EDIRC)

Access statistics for papers by Aleksandra Masłowska-Jokinen.

Last updated 2026-11-12. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pma880


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Working Papers

2016

  1. Post-Crisis Regulatory and Supervisory Arrangements – The New ‘Old’ Central Banking
    BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy Downloads
  2. “One size does not fit all” – institutional determinantsof financial safety net effectiveness
    NBP Working Papers, Narodowy Bank Polski Downloads View citations (1)

2014

  1. Central bank independence and sovereign debt crisis. Any link?
    Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics Downloads

2009

  1. Using Taylor Rule to Explain Effects of Institutional Changes in Central Banks
    Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics Downloads View citations (5)

2008

  1. Quest for the best: How to measure central bank independence and show its relation with inflation?
    Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics Downloads View citations (6)

2007

  1. Discussion on the Inconsistency of Central Bank Independence Measures
    Discussion Papers, Aboa Centre for Economics Downloads View citations (3)

Journal Articles

2011

  1. Quest for the Best: How to Measure Central Bank Independence and Show its Relationship with Inflation
    Czech Economic Review, 2011, 5, (2), 132-161 Downloads View citations (9)

Books

2016

  1. Central banking and monetary policy: Which will be the post-crisis new normal? Abstract: Central Bankers are currently facing big challenges in designing and implementing monetary policy, as well as with safeguarding financial stability, with the world economy still in the process of digesting the legacy of the crisis. The crisis has changed central banking in many ways: by shifting the focus of monetary policy from fighting too high inflation towards fighting too low inflation; by prompting new ‘experimental’ non-conventional measures, which risk to cause large, long-lasting market distortions and imbalances and which also have more far-reaching distributional consequences than ‘normal, conventional’ monetary policy; and by broadening central banks’ responsibilities particularly in the direction of safeguarding banking stability and financial stability at large. This raises several questions for the future: How long will ultra-easy monetary policies last? What are post-crisis growth trajectories, and how will the natural rate of interest rates evolve? How could an exit from ultra-easy monetary policy and a return towards higher nominal interest rates be eventually managed smoothly? Does ultra-easy monetary policy itself affect the economy in a lasting and structural way? Is the pre-crisis economic paradigm governing monetary policy still valid? If not, in what ways should it be adjusted? Are there any reasonable and practical alternatives? Against this background and given the larger post-crisis range of central banks’ responsibilities: is the current institutionalset-up governing central banks and their relationship to government, Parliament and the financial system still appropriate? What adaptations might be considered? Would they bring an improvement or, on the contrary, a set-back to the unsuccessful policy approaches of the 1960s and 1970s?
    SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum Downloads View citations (2)
  2. The SSM at 1
    SUERF Studies, SUERF - The European Money and Finance Forum Downloads View citations (2)
 
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