Details about Sabitha Nagarajan

Access statistics for papers by Sabitha Nagarajan.

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Short-id: pna422

Working Papers

1997

1. Are Financial Corners and Short Squeezes Inefficient?
   New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-
2. Can Delegating Bank Regulation to Market Forces Really Work?
   New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business- View citations (1)
3. Design of Efficient Bankruptcy Mechanisms
   New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-
4. Efficient Security Design: Theory and Application
   New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-
5. State-Contingent Bank Regulation
   New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-

1993

6. Are Limited Liability Contracts Efficient? Theory and Application
   Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business
7. Forbearance, Deposit Insurance Pricing, and Incentive Compatible Bank Regulation
   Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business
   See also Journal Article Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation, Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier (1995) View citations (24) (1995)

1992

8. A Theory of Trading Intermediation Under Multilateral Asymmetric Information
   Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business
9. Efficient Trading System Design: Market Makers, Membership Fees,a nd Exchange Ownership Structure
   Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business
10. On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence
    Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business
    See also Journal Article On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence, Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier (1996) View citations (16) (1996)

1991

11. Financial Contracts as Lasting Commitments: The Case of Leveraged Oligopoly
    Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business View citations (2)
    See also Journal Article Financial contracts as lasting commitments: The case of a leveraged oligopoly, Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier (1992) View citations (11) (1992)

1988

12. ON THE EFFICIENCY OF TAKEOVERS
    Working Papers, Columbia - Graduate School of Business

Journal Articles

2010

1. From the Margins to Centre Stage: ‘Indian’ Demonstration Effects in Malaysia’s Political Landscape
   Urban Studies, 2010, 47, (6), 1257-1278 View citations (1)

1998

2. State-contingent regulatory mechanisms and fairly priced deposit insurance
   Journal of Banking & Finance, 1998, 22, (9), 1139-1156 View citations (11)

1996

3. On the strategic role of high leverage in entry deterrence
   Journal of Banking & Finance, 1996, 20, (1), 1-23 View citations (16)
   See also Working Paper On the Strategic Role of High Leverage in Entry Deterrence, Working Papers (1992) (1992)

1995

4. Forbearance, deposit insurance pricing, and incentive compatible bank regulation
   Journal of Banking & Finance, 1995, 19, (6), 1109-1130 View citations (24)
   See also Working Paper Forbearance, Deposit Insurance Pricing, and Incentive Compatible Bank Regulation, Working Papers (1993) (1993)
5. On the Generic Efficiency of Takeovers under Incomplete Information
   Journal of Economic Theory, 1995, 65, (2), 522-556 View citations (3)

1992

6. Financial contracts as lasting commitments: The case of a leveraged oligopoly
   Journal of Financial Intermediation, 1992, 2, (1), 2-32 View citations (11)
   See also Working Paper Financial Contracts as Lasting Commitments: The Case of Leveraged Oligopoly, Working Papers (1991) View citations (2) (1991)