Details about Martin Pollrich

Access statistics for papers by Martin Pollrich.

Last updated 2024-11-08. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: ppo542

Working Papers

2023

1. On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification
   Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
2. The irrelevance of fee structures for certification
   Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers, Berlin School of Economics
   See also Journal Article The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification, American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association (2024) View citations (1) (2024)

2020

3. Optimal Auctions With Signaling Bidders
   CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany View citations (6)
   Also in ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research (2020) View citations (6)
4. Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations
   CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series, University of Bonn and University of Mannheim, Germany View citations (2)
   Also in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series, CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition (2018)
   See also Journal Article Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations, Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier (2020) View citations (2) (2020)

2019

5. Incomplete contracts in dynamic procurement
   ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research View citations (1)
6. Sequential procurement with limited commitment
   ZEW Discussion Papers, ZEW - Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research View citations (4)

2015

7. Mediated Audits
   Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich
   Also in BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics View citations (4)
   See also Journal Article Mediated audits, RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation (2017) View citations (3) (2017)
8. Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the curse of firm relocation
   BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics View citations (3)

2014

9. An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation
   VfS Annual Conference 2014 (Hamburg): Evidence-based Economic Policy, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association
   Also in Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich (2014)
10. Informational opacity and honest certification
    Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich View citations (1)
    Also in BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics View citations (2)
    Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research (2013) View citations (2)

2013

11. An optimal incentive contract to avert firm relocation under unilateral environmental regulation
    VfS Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association

Undated

12. The Maximum Punishment Principle and Precision of Audits under Limited Commitment - Preliminary and Incomplete Version -
    BDPEMS Working Papers, Berlin School of Economics View citations (2)

Journal Articles

2024

1. The Irrelevance of Fee Structures for Certification
   American Economic Review: Insights, 2024, 6, (1), 55-72 View citations (1)
   See also Working Paper The irrelevance of fee structures for certification, Berlin School of Economics Discussion Papers (2023) (2023)

2022

2. Incomplete Contracts in Multi-period Procurement
   Management Science, 2022, 68, (7), 5146-5161 View citations (1)
3. Information design in sequential procurement
   Games and Economic Behavior, 2022, 135, (C), 79-85

2020

4. Sweet lemons: Mitigating collusion in organizations
   Journal of Economic Theory, 2020, 189, (C) View citations (2)
   See also Working Paper Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations, CRC TR 224 Discussion Paper Series (2020) View citations (2) (2020)

2017

5. Mediated audits
   RAND Journal of Economics, 2017, 48, (1), 44-68 View citations (3)
   See also Working Paper Mediated Audits, Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems (2015) (2015)

2016

6. Imprecise information disclosure and truthful certification
   European Economic Review, 2016, 89, (C), 345-360 View citations (4)

2013

7. Gütesiegel: zu detaillierte Angaben können die Funktionsfähigkeit der Zertifikate schmälern
   DIW Wochenbericht, 2013, 80, (19), 15-18