Details about Guillem Roig
Guillem Roig edits the NEP report on Contract Theory and Applications. Access statistics for papers by Guillem Roig.
Last updated 2023-08-07. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pro903
Jump to Journal Articles
Working Papers
2020
- Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
See also Journal Article Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2022) (2022)
- The value of cooperative investment in nonexclusive contracts
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
2018
- Investment and Market Structure in Common Agency Games
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
2017
- Bilateral Investment in a Delegated Common Agency
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
- Duopolistic competition in markets where consumers have switching costs
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
- Product Compatibility as an Strategy to Hinder Entry Deterrence
Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario
Also in Documentos de Trabajo, Universidad del Rosario (2017)
Journal Articles
2022
- Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2022, 22, (1), 297-310
See also Working Paper Tacit Collusion with Consumer Preference Costs, Documentos de Trabajo (2020) (2020)
- The value of investment in nonexclusive contracts
Economic Inquiry, 2022, 60, (3), 1018-1037
2021
- Collusive equilibria with switching costs: The effect of consumer concentration
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 2021, 30, (1), 100-121
2020
- Competition with Nonexclusive Contracts: Tackling the Hold-Up Problem
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2020, 20, (2), 21
- PRODUCT COMPATIBILITY HINDERS PRE‐EMPTIVE ADVERTISING
Economic Inquiry, 2020, 58, (4), 1663-1688
|
The links between different versions of a paper are constructed automatically by matching on the titles.
Please contact if a link is incorrect.
Use this form
to add links between versions where the titles do not match.
|