Details about Huiping Yuan
Access statistics for papers by Huiping Yuan.
Last updated 2013-11-11. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pyu72
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Working Papers
2013
- Target Controllability and Time Consistency: Complement to the Tinbergen Rule
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
2011
- The Optimality and Controllability of Discretionary Monetary Policy
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics
2009
- Consistent Targets and Optimal Monetary Policy: Conservative Central Banker Redux
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics View citations (2)
- Designing Central Bank Loss Functions
Working Papers, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics View citations (1)
See also Journal Article Designing Central Bank Loss Functions, International Journal of Business and Economics, School of Management Development, Feng Chia University, Taichung, Taiwan (2010) (2010)
- Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules
Working Papers, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics 
See also Journal Article Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules, Economic Modelling, Elsevier (2010) View citations (4) (2010)
- The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics View citations (2)
See also Journal Article THE OPTIMALITY AND CONTROLLABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY THROUGH DELEGATION WITH CONSISTENT TARGETS, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society (2011) View citations (4) (2011)
- The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Implementation Theory Framework for Monetary Policy
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics View citations (1)
Also in Working Papers, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics (2009)
- The Optimality and Controllability of Monetary Policy through Delegation with Consistent Targets
Working Papers, University of Nevada, Las Vegas , Department of Economics 
See also Journal Article THE OPTIMALITY AND CONTROLLABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY THROUGH DELEGATION WITH CONSISTENT TARGETS, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, Scottish Economic Society (2011) View citations (4) (2011)
- Understanding Central Bank Loss Functions: Implied and Delegated Targets
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics View citations (1)
2007
- A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules
Working papers, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics 
See also Journal Article Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules, Economic Modelling, Elsevier (2010) View citations (4) (2010)
Journal Articles
2011
- THE OPTIMALITY AND CONTROLLABILITY OF MONETARY POLICY THROUGH DELEGATION WITH CONSISTENT TARGETS
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 2011, 58, (1), 82-106 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper The Optimality and Controllability of Monetary Policy through Delegation with Consistent Targets, Working Papers (2009) (2009) Working Paper The Making of Optimal and Consistent Policy: An Analytical Framework for Monetary Models, Working papers (2009) View citations (2) (2009)
2010
- Designing Central Bank Loss Functions
International Journal of Business and Economics, 2010, 9, (1), 77-81 
See also Working Paper Designing Central Bank Loss Functions, Working Papers (2009) View citations (1) (2009)
- Implementing optimal monetary policy: Objectives and rules
Economic Modelling, 2010, 27, (3), 737-745 View citations (4)
See also Working Paper Implementing Optimal Monetary Policy: Objectives and Rules, Working Papers (2009) (2009) Working Paper A General Schema for Optimal Monetary Policymaking: Objectives and Rules, Working papers (2007) (2007)
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