Intensity of Effort in Contests with Few or Many Winners

Dimitry Rtischev

Gakushuin Economic Papers, 2020, vol. 57, issue 1-2, 93-108

Abstract: The paper applies multi-prize contest theory to explore the connection between scarcity of prizes and intensity of competition. Equilibrium levels of effort are compared across contests that differ in the number of prizes and in which the utility of winning or losing is influenced by the relative numbers of winners and losers. Application to the study of socioeconomic competition is discussed.

Keywords: contest theory; socioeconomic competition; psychosocial utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D11 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:abc:gakuep:57-1-2-6

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