Some Sectoral and Global Distributional Issues in Greenhouse Gas Policy Design

John Freebairn

Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 2008, vol. 15, issue 1, 13-28

Abstract: This paper argues it will be welfare-improving at a national level to auction tradable greenhouse gas permits, and, at an international level, for first-world countries to bribe third-world countries to join a cooperative solution.

Date: 2008
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:agenda:v:15:y:2008:i:1:p:13-28

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