Error and Design: Economics in (and some Economics of) the Australian Competition Tribunal

Henry Ergas

Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 2009, vol. 16, issue 3, 71-94

Abstract: The Australian Competition Tribunal plays a central role in the Australian regulatory system. Three of the Tribunal’s recent decisions are examined and found to have significant errors. It is argued on the basis of the economics of the institutional design that these errors are inevitable in a system where regulatory decisions are based on vague standards. It is concluded that the quality of regulation would be improved by a shift to a regulatory system that relied less on such vague standards and more on prescriptive, explicit rules.

Date: 2009
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://press-files.anu.edu.au/downloads/press/p88621/pdf/07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acb:agenda:v:16:y:2009:i:3:p:71-94

Access Statistics for this article

More articles in Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform from Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().