Evidence-free Policy: The Case of the National Injury Insurance Scheme

Mark Harrison

Agenda - A Journal of Policy Analysis and Reform, 2013, vol. 20, issue 1, 55-70

Abstract: The Productivity Commission report 'Disability Care and Support' recommends tort liability be replaced by a compulsory, government-run, no-fault scheme. But theory and evidence indicate moving to a no-fault scheme will increase the accident rate. Even a move from non-risk-rated third-party insurance to non-risk-rated first-party insurance reduces incentives for care. A no-fault scheme is not superior to current policies; genuine reform will need to be informed by law and economics literature.

Date: 2013
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