Global Financial Sanctions: An Empirical Application with a Game Theory Approach

Yaşar Köse
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Yaşar Köse: Turkish Military Academy

Journal of Finance Letters (Maliye ve Finans Yazıları), 2015, vol. 30, issue 103, 10-20

Abstract: In this study, it has been aimed to reveal that financial sanc¬tions within the frame of a “game theory” that is used by any state or a group of states for the realization of its demand from another state or a group of states without using any military forces can be analyzed. It has been specified that there could be a combination of strategy that creates an equilibrium with the strategies developed by the country applying financial sanctions and the target country. In the case study analyzed, a 4X3 winning matrix that reflects three strategies for Russia and four strategies for USA and EU is created in addition to make an evaluation for proposed analytical model.

Keywords: Financial Sanctions; Game Theory; Nash Equilibrium; Case Study. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:acc:malfin:v:30:y:2015:i:103:p:10-20

DOI: 10.33203/mfy.307215

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