CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AS URGENT PROBLEM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION CONSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

A. A. Bolotskikh

Russian Journal of Industrial Economics, 2015, issue 1

Abstract: The author considers a problem of Central Bank independence of Russian Federation. Various standpoints are analyzed, and the author’s own view on this category is expressed. It is noted that difficulties in studying the category of independence as applied to the Central Bank and the Russian Federation stem from that there is no its legal definition in current legislation. The author studies the notion of independence principle as regards the Central Bank and the Russian Federation and introduces a corresponding definition into constitutional division of legal science. The role of Central Bank independence in the legal regulation of public relations is emphasized. A number of the law deficiencies are noted that exist in the effective legislation. In this connection the concrete measures are offered to improve the legislative regulation concerning Central Bank independence of the Russian Federation.

Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ach:journl:y:2015:id:326

DOI: 10.17073/2072-1633-2011-1-37-39

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