La logique des systèmes bonus-malus en assurance automobile: une approche théorique

Dominique Henriet and Jean Rochet

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1986, issue 1, 133-152

Abstract: Two justifications can be found for the use of a system of bonuses and penalties in automobile insurance. The first refers to risk selection, the second to the inducement to greater prudence at the wheel. Based on a model which incorporates both factors, it appears that the system of bonuses and penalties should be radically different depending on the primacy of one factor or the other. From the stand point of risk selection, only the observed frequence of past accidents matters; but in order to incite safe driving the time element should enter in the tarification. In the light of the theoretical discussion, the French insurance clauses of 1976 and 1984 are reviewed.

Date: 1986
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