Rationnement, anticipations rationnelles et équilibres de Stackelberg

Marcel Boyer and Michel Moreaux

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1986, issue 1, 55-73

Abstract: We consider a Stackelberg like duopoly in which the strategy space of the firms are price-quantity pairs, meaning that, at this price, a firm is willing to sell at most the supplied quantity. It is shown that, at the equilibrium, the leader will quote a price lower than the price quoted by the follower, and that, at the price he quotes, he will ration his demand. Hence we get a market structure in which price rigidities and persistent excess demand are immediate outcomes of the non-competitive behiavior of some agents.

Date: 1986
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Working Paper: Rationnement, Anticipations Rationnelles et Equilibres de Stackelberg (1985)
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