L'Enchére optimale dans l'hypothése de dépendance des évaluations: une caractérisation

Florence Naegelen

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1988, issue 10, 23-43

Abstract: When the seller has only incomplete information about the agents' willingness to pay for the good up for sale, under the hypothesis of risk neutraly, an optimal auction does not lead to the full appropriation of the surplus by the seller when the agents' evaluations are independent. This result is however no more valid when those evaluations are correlated. The object of this article is to explicit the attribution and paiement rules of an auction which enables the seller to capture the full surplus in a model with two agents, when the evaluations, which can assume two values, are positively or negatively correlated.

Date: 1988
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075694 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1988:i:10:p:23-43

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().