Information et différenciation du produit sur un marché de duopole

Michel Cavagnac ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1989, issue 14, 39-64

Abstract: This paper focuses on the role of the information in the following decision problem: two duopolists choose to diversify or not their product line by issuing a new good. Using the tools of the non cooperative game theory, we examine successively a simultaneous game and a sequential one. In each game the case of the complete information is first resolved: then the analysis is developed in an incomplete information context. The results are finally extended to a competitive model à la Hotelling.

Date: 1989
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:14:p:39-64

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