Collusion in Auctions

Kenneth Hendricks and Robert Porter

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1989, issue 15-16, 217-230

Abstract: Despite substantial legal evidence of collusion in auctions, there has been very little theoretical or empirical work on this subject by economists. This survey paper discusses mechanisms that are likely to facilitate collusion in auctions, as well as methods of detecting the presence of these schemes. The principal message of this paper is that the presence and the characteristics of collusive mechanisms depend critically on the nature of the object being auctioned, and on the particular auction rules. Accordingly, empirical work should be tailored to specific cases.

Date: 1989
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (52)

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Working Paper: Collusion in Auctions (1989)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:15-16:p:217-230

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