Refinancement, liquidation et rationnement du crédit: une approche bayesienne

Bernard Belloc and Xavier Freixas

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1989, issue 15-16, 231-266

Abstract: We examine the relationship between borrowers (firms) and lenders (banks), in a dynamic context, with asymmetric information. In particular, we take into account the fact that firms which apply for a grant have a past. They have liability and the banks will take it into consideration when making their decisions, for extending or not the credit of a defaulting firm. Using the concept of sequential equilibrium, we prove the existence of several types of equilibria. An extreme form of credit rationing can appear in some equilibria, because banks can play mixed strategies, and liquidate some defaulting firms. At last, we compare the efficiency of the different equilibria, and the interest factors which prevail in each of them.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075759 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:15-16:p:231-266

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().