Choix des produits: concurrence en qualité et en variété

Damien Neven and Jacques Thisse

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1989, issue 15-16, 85-112

Abstract: A duopoly model encompassing both horizontal and vertical differentiation is analysed. We seek subgame perfect Nash equilibria in a game where firms choose, first, the horizontal (variety) and the vertical (quality) characteristics of their product and, then, compete in prices. We show that, whatever the products' characteristics, a price equilibrium exists. In the product selection stage, firms choose maximum differentiation along one of the characteristics and minimum differentiation along the other. When the quality range is broad enough relative to the variety range, firms choose the same variety but maximise differentiation in quality. Otherwise, they both choose the maximum quality but maximise their difference in terms of variety.

Date: 1989
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075752 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Choix des produits: concurrence en qualité et en variété (1989)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1989:i:15-16:p:85-112

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General (publications@ensae.fr) and Laurent Linnemer (laurent.linnemer@ensae.fr).