Contrats de travail répétés: le rôle de la mémoire

Pierre-André Chiappori and Ines Macho-Stadler

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1990, issue 17, 47-70

Abstract: We consider a repeated moral hazard model. We make two assumptions, which are specific of labor markets (no-commitment from the agent, accumulation of human capital). The optimal contract may be with or without memory, depending on parameters. In particular, there is no memory for "high enough" reservation utilities.

Date: 1990
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1990:i:17:p:47-70

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