Niveaux de négociations salariales et performances macroéconomiques

Pierre Cahuc and Andre Zylberberg ()

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1991, issue 23, 1-12

Abstract: This paper studies, in a general equilibrium model with imperfect competition, the economic efficiency of union wage settings arrangements at centralized, industry, and decentralized levels. The wage agreement at industry level is Pareto inefficient and entails the highest unemployment rate. The centralized wage setting dominates both industry and decentralized wage setting under the Pareto criterion.

Date: 1991
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:23:p:1-12

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