Contrats de licences et asymétrie d'information

Ines Macho-Stadler and David Perez-Castrillo

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1991, issue 24, 189-208

Abstract: This paper deals with the form of licencing contracts when there is asymmetric information. We show that when the licensor has private information he can signals the high quality patents through contracts based on royalties. Conversely, when the licensee has more information about the value of the patent, contracts including only a fixed fee attract those for whom the innovation has a high value.

Date: 1991
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075849 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1991:i:24:p:189-208

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().