Nash Equilibrium and Evolutionary Stability in Large and Finite Populations

Vincent Crawford

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1992, issue 25-26, 299-313

Abstract: This paper studies the correspondence between Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability in large and finite populations. Whenever the payoff function of the game that describes the simultaneous interaction of the individuals in the population, and thereby determines their fitnesses, is sufficiently continuous, an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in a large population corresponds to a symmetric Nash equilibrium in that game, and a strict, symmetric Nash equilibrium in that game corresponds to a large-population ESS. This correspondence continues to hold, approximately, in finite populations; and it holds exactly for strict pure-strategy equilibria in sufficiently large finite populations.

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:299-313

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