Information and Rationality: Some Comments

Sylvain Sorin

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1992, issue 25-26, 315-325

Abstract: The purpose of this note is to analyze some properties of two concepts that are widely used in game theory, namely information and rationality, and more specifically to clarify their relation. Starting with the basic approach where rationality is "maximisation given the information", one is led, as soon as there are many players, to different models depending on the information space. We explicitely describe an "open model" (the knowledge of the players is not even public but coherent), a "closed model" (where either the game itself is common knowledge or even more the rationality of the players is common knowledge) and a "local model" (where at a certain state of the world rationality emerges).

Date: 1992
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:315-325

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