The Assignment Game: The Reduced Game

Guillermo Owen

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1992, issue 25-26, 71-79

Abstract: Let v be an assignment game. For a given reference payoff vector (x; y), and a coalition S, bargaining within the coalition can be represented by either the reduced game or the derived game. It is known that the reduced game need not be an assignment game (in fact, it need not be super additive) while the derived game is another assignment game, with modified reservation prices. We prove that, when the reference vector is in the core of the game, the derived game is the super additive cover of the reduced game.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075857 (text/html)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:25-26:p:71-79

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().