Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Bargaining over Many Issues

Clara Ponsati

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1992, issue 25-26, 81-100

Abstract: A non-cooperative game of two parties bargaining an agreement involving n issues, each of which can be resolved in only two possible ways, is presented. Conditions under which there is a unique Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) are provided. Along this equilibrium bargainers usually reach an agreement by means of trading a favourable solution on some of the issues in exchange for an unfavourable solution on the others, and some delay is necessary.

Date: 1992
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