Multi-principaux avec anti-sélection

David Martimort

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1992, issue 28, 1-37

Abstract: This article departs from the classical Incentive Theory and his Grand Contrat approach by allowing a common agent to contract with multiple principals, each one controlling one agent's activity through a non linear tarification. In this framework, the Revelation Principle has to be replaced by a weaker concept: an Equivalence Principle. We derive the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of the offers' game and we compare them to the cooperative solution. Results are shown to depend on the complementarity or the substituability between activities controlled by each principal.

Date: 1992
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.jstor.org/stable/20075882 (text/html)

Related works:
Working Paper: Multi-principaux avec anti-selection (1992)
Working Paper: Multi-Principaux avec Anti-Sélection (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adr:anecst:y:1992:i:28:p:1-37

Access Statistics for this article

Annals of Economics and Statistics is currently edited by Laurent Linnemer

More articles in Annals of Economics and Statistics from GENES Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Secretariat General () and Laurent Linnemer ().