Concurrence et biens publics

Suzanne Scotchmer

Annals of Economics and Statistics, 1994, issue 33, 157-186

Abstract: I discuss the extent to which the theory of local public goods and clubs is an extension of competitive theory. To do this I reinterpret efficiency results in the literature as arising from optimization against a complete price system. For clubs I give a framework to unify club economies with anonymous and nonanonymous crowding. Competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the equal-treatment core, and core payoffs satisfy a monotonicity property: An increase in the number of one type of player will reduce their core payoff. When the partition of the population is constrained by fixed geographic boundaries, efficiency is second-best. A complete price system can be used to describe capitalization, and optimization relative to this price system leads to second-best efficiency. For both branches of the literature I offer criticisms of the price systems and equilibrium concepts.

Date: 1994
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